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I. INTRODUCTION
“As any basic text teaches, any thing or event can be used as a basis of
taxation. . . . Despite the potential for long-term effects, to date the
controversies over taxes and the Internet have exponentially produced more
heat than light.”1 If consumer purchases are going to be subject to tax, all
purchases should be taxed.2 The sales tax has many exclusions, one of the
most important being sales made by remote sellers that are subject to a de
facto exemption.3 However, these sales may also be subject to a use tax,
which is a form of sales tax on purchases made outside the purchaser’s home
state for taxable items the purchaser will store, use, or consume in their
home state on which no tax was collected in the state purchased.4
Use taxes are better understood to be companions of sale taxes because
credits are given for the sales tax paid to avoid double taxation.5 Put simply,
1. William V. Vetter, Preying on the Web: Tax Collection in the Virtual World, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
649, 651 (2001) (reviewing debates on taxes and Internet transactions). William V. Vetter is an assistant
professor at Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne. He earned his J.D. from University of
Oregon and an L.L.M in Taxation from George Washington University, D.C.
2. See John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the TwentyFirst Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2003) (describing the nuances of sales and use tax from a policy
perspective).
3. See id. at 353 (identifying statewide patterns in U.S. sales taxes).
4. In Texas, the rates for sales and use taxes are both 6.25% of the sales price. TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. §§ 151.051, 151.101. The Texas Tax Code also contains provisions defining when a retailer
conducts business in Texas. TAX § 151.107.
5. See Vetter, supra note 1, at 663 (describing use tax as a protective measure from double
taxation).
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if you do not pay a state sales tax, you owe your domicile state a use tax. If
you do pay a state sales tax, you still technically owe your home state a use
tax, but you are credited by the amount you paid.6 In many states, the use
tax rate is the same as the sales tax rate.7 The most notable difference is
that sales taxes are collected by sellers who act as an agent of the state,
whereas use taxes are self-assessed and reported by consumers—if they are
reported at all.8
Consider the position of a seller with an obligation to collect sales tax on
every transaction. Should every seller be subjected to this requirement? Or
should the application of this requirement be limited and allow for
exceptions? How should states approach widespread variations in tax rates?
The taxing jurisdiction has a significant impact because the tax rates vary
within states, cities, and counties. For example, a business may want to be
subject to the sales tax in Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, or
Oregon, where the base sales tax rate is a whopping 0%.9 Businesses will
likely avoid tax jurisdiction in Louisiana because it is the state with the
highest combined rate and second highest average local rate, with a
combined local and state tax rate of up to 10%.10
These are only some of the questions we face in light of South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc.,11 and the taxation without representation debate.12 The
purpose of this Comment is to explore the answers to these questions.
Ultimately, this Comment concludes the Supreme Court correctly revisited
the issue of nexus requirements for e-commerce taxation collection;

6. See id. (conceptualizing credit for sales tax paid in another jurisdiction).
7. See id. (“With respect to every significant factor, except taxable event, sales taxes and use taxes
are identical.”).
8. For additional background information into sales and use taxes, see generally Emily L. Patch,
Note, Online Retailers Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 673 (2013) (providing a historical account of the evolution of e-commerce).
9. State Rates, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/taxrates/en/staterates.html?referrer=https
%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&lastReferrer=www.avalara.com&sessionId=1545578349394
[http://perma.cc/VR6Z-34KX].
10. See Michael B. Sauter, States with the Highest and Lowest Sales Taxes, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/taxes/2018/03/27/states-highest-and-lowest-salestaxes/452512002/ [http://perma.cc/UX52-25NQ] (providing the sales tax and combined sales tax of
multiple states); State Rates, supra note 9.
11. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
12. See id. at 2099 (holding states may impose sales taxes on out-of-state transactions regardless
of physical presence in the taxing state).
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however, this Comment aims to fill in the gaps the Court incorrectly decided
were better left to Congress.
This Comment will begin with an overview of online sales tax to create a
foundation for the discussion in Part II. The overview will describe the
purpose and need for a reform of the sales tax nexus standards. It will also
provide a historical background as well as an analysis of case law to show
how the Supreme Court has shaped their view over time. Part III will
discuss who decided the issues correctly and why based upon the decision’s
impact, burden, and government intervention. Part IV analyzes current
responses and criticism, and proposes a resolution.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ONLINE SALES TAX
A. Purpose and Need for Reform
Electronic commercial transactions, or e-commerce, has developed
exponentially over the last fifty years.13 By 2011, business to consumer ecommerce “totaled $4.1 trillion [in sales] and had grown at an annual
compounded rate of 13.0 percent since 2000.”14 This development has
created implications for state governments because “[s]ellers only collect
sales tax” when the seller has a nexus in the consumer’s home state.15 The
result is essentially a tax evasion—the consumers that are not charged sales
tax usually do not pay the use tax their home state imposes.16 This tax
evasion reduces the price, which electronic retailers, or e-tailers, appear to
take advantage of by avoiding the creation of nexus and, ultimately, tax
responsibility.17
Consequently, states have experienced a steady decline in tax collections
as e-commerce continues to grow.18 In 2012, a University of Tennessee
study approximated that states lost almost $23 billion from their inability to
13. Taxation issues arising from nontraditional retailers, those that conduct sales without a
brick-and-mortar store, date back to 1967. See Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
757–59 (1967) (holding mail-order sellers were not required to collect sales tax unless it had some form
of physical presence in the state).
14. Donald Bruce et al., E-Tailer Sales Tax Nexus and State Tax Policies, 68 NAT’L TAX J. 735, 736
(2015).
15. See id. (examining how state tax policy affects the establishment of nexus in each state).
16. See id. (explaining consumers not charged a sales tax will not pay, resulting in a form of tax
evasion).
17. See id. (“[E]-tailers appear to arrange their affairs to avoid establishing nexus . . . .”).
18. See id. (“Annual e-commerce sales tax revenue losses are estimated to be $11.4 billion . . . for
2012 . . . and will likely continue to grow rapidly . . . .”).
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collect taxes on online purchases from different states.19 In 2018, both the
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the International
Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) updated these numbers, and estimated
uncollected taxes increased to almost $26 billion per year, of which more
than $17 billion were from e-commerce.20 Unsurprisingly, states have tried
to tap into this revenue for years.21 States will likely remain unsuccessful;
since many Internet businesses are solely online, incorporated in one state,
and sell products across all states, the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution regulates e-commerce transactions.22
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution sets forth
the right of equal protection, stating that no state shall “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”23 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as meaning “that citizens
cannot be unfairly taxed and thus deprived of their tax dollars.”24 Thus,
states may not tax sellers unless minimum contacts or a nexus has been
satisfied.25 An inquiry into due process focuses on whether the out-of-state
taxpayer’s connections with the forum state are sufficient to give notice that
it may be taxed by the state.26 The Commerce Clause, which is more
restrictive than the Due Process Clause, expressly provides Congress with
the power “to regulate commerce . . . among the states.”27 Though
Congress may not authorize states the right to tax without satisfying the

19. See Max Behlke & Jake Lestock, Remote Sales Tax Collection, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.
(June 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/e-fairness-legislation-overview.aspx
[http://perma.cc/RYH4-6CMS] (describing the massive losses states endure due to consumer sales
tax evasion).
20. See id.
21. See Christina T. Le, The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down on the Virtual World’s Tax-Free
Love Affair with E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 395, 401 (2007).
22. See id. (explaining how the regulation of Internet business falls within the powers of the
Commerce Clause).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. Le, supra note 21, at 401.
25. Id.
26. See Sidney S. Silhan, Comment, If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It: An Argument for The Codification
of the Quill Standard for Taxing Internet Commerce, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 679 (2007) (“The Due
Process analysis centers on whether a taxpayer’s connections with the jurisdiction are sufficient to give
notice that it may be haled into court, or subject to a tax, in that jurisdiction.”).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (setting forth congressional powers to regulate commerce);
see Silhan, supra note 26, at 680–81 (reiterating the power Congress possesses through the Commerce
Clause).
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requirements of the Due Process Clause,28 the Commerce Clause allows
Congress to legislate the level of physical presence required to establish a
substantial nexus with the forum state.29
Nevertheless, because Congress has not done so, the Supreme Court has
stepped in to make a decision on the constitutionality.30 The Supreme
Court has debated its scope of power in restricting state regulation under
the dormant Commerce Clause for decades.31 Though the Supreme Court
has restricted their role over time, it has continued to exercise considerable
power over state taxes.32
B. Historical Background
Since 1967, people have tried defining when a substantial nexus between
states and taxpayers exists.33 The debate has continued for over fifty
years.34 The conflict boils down to who and what creates physical
presence.35 Before Wayfair, the Supreme Court last addressed this issue of
tax nexus in 1992.36 In the meantime, the Court left the issue to be
determined by state judiciaries that have “resolved” the same questions with
conflicting solutions—only adding to the ambiguity and unpredictability

28. Silhan, supra note 26, at 680.
29. Id. (“The dormant Commerce Clause allows Congress to prevent the states from imposing
taxes that are restrictive of interstate commerce. It also allows Congress to require minimum standards,
such as physical presence in the state, before taxation can occur.”).
30. See id. at 681 (stating the Supreme Court created a four-part test).
31. See Adam B. Thimmesch, A Unifying Approach to Nexus Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 101 (2018).
32. See id. (“Specifically, the Court has continued to restrict states’ power to compel out-of-state
vendors to collect their sales and use taxes based on a physical-presence ‘nexus’ rule.”).
33. See Jonathan E. Maddison, Why Wayfair Won’t Matter, TAX EXEC. (May 31, 2018),
http://taxexecutive.org/why-wayfair-wont-matter/ [http://perma.cc/SR8X-H7TC] (explaining the
difficulty in determining when a nexus exists).
34. Id.
35. See id. (“For over fifty years, states and businesses have struggled to understand when a
‘substantial nexus’ exists between a state and a taxpayer, leading to the unavoidable debate over two
words: physical presence.”).
36. Id. The last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of tax nexus was in the 1992 case
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (creating the
physical presence test).
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that encompasses substantial nexus.37 As technology continues to develop
and influence our nation’s economy, the debate has intensified.38
In Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue,39 the Supreme Court decided
retailers were not required to collect taxes where the seller did not have a
physical presence in the consumer’s state.40 In 1992, this decision was
reaffirmed in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,41 which regulated the collection of
online sales tax for almost twenty-five years.42 However, as Kennedy wrote,
it is important to note that when Quill was decided, fewer than 2% of people
in the United States had access to the Internet,43 whereas today that number
has increased to almost 89%.44 Kennedy also stated that in 1992, “the
Court could not have envisioned a world in which the world’s largest retailer
would be a remote seller.”45
Consequently, in 2018 the Supreme Court revisited the issue in South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., in which the Court was left to choose between
affirming or rejecting the physical presence rule.46 The controversy led to
a 5–4 split in the decision.47 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts
wrote:

37. See Maddison, supra note 33 (highlighting how contradicting answers have resulted in further
ambiguity).
38. See, e.g., id. (“To many, Wayfair is good reason to hope for clarity in a landscape riddled with
uncertainty. That hope is bolstered by the prospect of the Court clarifying not only questions dating
to 1967 but also questions stemming from the growth of the internet and online shopping.”).
39. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
40. See id. at 758 (recognizing retailers do not have to collect taxes when they have no physical
presence in a particular state); see also Maddison, supra note 33 (“[A] state cannot require an out-ofstate seller to collect and remit use tax for sales to in-state purchasers.”).
41. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992) (reaffirming states cannot force an
out-of-state retailer to collect taxes).
42. See Maddison, supra note 33.
43. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018) (noting the drastic change
in Internet usage since the Quill decision).
44. Id.; see Maddison, supra note 33 (“These issues were (and continue to be) exacerbated by the
evolution of technology and its impact on the national economy.”).
45. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (citing Shan Li, Amazon Overtakes Wal–Mart as Biggest Retailer,
L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-walmart-20150724story.html [https://perma.cc/6YFL-ZCCM]; see Maddison, supra note 33 (reaffirming the Supreme
Court did not foresee how popular online shopping would become).
46. See Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 2097 (revisiting the physical presence rule); see also Maddison,
supra note 33 (representing the culmination of the physical presence debate).
47. See id. at 2087 (revealing there was not a unanimous opinion).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2020

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 51 [2020], No. 3, Art. 5

750

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:743

This is neither the first, nor the second, but the third time this Court has been
asked whether a State may obligate sellers with no physical presence within its
borders to collect tax on sales to residents. Whatever salience the adage “third
time’s a charm” has in daily life, it is a poor guide to Supreme Court
decisionmaking.48

In order to better understand the impact of the decision and whether it is
the best decision for approaching the nexus of remote sellers in ecommerce, a closer look at the precedential cases is required.
C. Analysis: Changes in Law, Distinctions, Where Are We Now
1.

Discussion of Bellas Hess

National Bellas Hess (National) was a popular merchandise catalog and
mail-order house in the 1900s.49 Customers mailed their orders to
National’s Missouri plant, and National either mailed the goods to
customers or delivered the goods through a common carrier.50 National
did not have an office, distributor, warehouse, business, or representative in
Illinois.51 In this case, the Supreme Court held that a company must have
a nexus with a state to be responsible for tax liability.52 Further, the
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from imposing use tax on a seller whose
only connection in the state is common carrier or mail.53 Justice Stewart
wrote that imposing this kind of burden on the state could create
“unjustifiable local entanglements” that “Congress alone has the power [to
regulate] and control.”54

48. Id. at 2102 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see generally Debra Weiss, Supreme Court Clears Way for
States to Collect Sales Tax from Internet Retailers, ABA J. (June 21, 2018, 9:50 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_clears_way_for_states_to_collect_sales_t
ax_from_internet_reta) [http://perma.cc/54UN-S4TN] (quoting Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion
in the Wayfair case).
49. Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753–54 (1967).
50. Id. at 754–55.
51. Id. at 754.
52. Id. at 755–56.
53. Id. at 758.
54. Id. at 759–60 (1967) (Justice Stewart continued: “[t]he many variations in rates of tax, in
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record keeping requirements could entangle National’s
interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate
claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government.’”).
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Discussion of Complete Auto Transit

In 1977, consistent with the holding of Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court
established the standard for applying the Commerce Clause to state taxes in
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady.55 Here, a corporation was “engaged in
the business of transporting motor vehicles by motor carrier for General
Motors Corporation.”56 The corporation claimed that the taxes assessed
by the Mississippi Tax Commission were unconstitutional based on
Supreme Court holdings that taxing on the privilege of engaging in an
activity may not be applied to activities that are a part of interstate
commerce.57 The Court affirmed a four-prong test, requiring: (1) a
substantial nexus between the state and the taxpayer, (2) the tax not
discriminate against interstate commerce, (3) the tax not be unfairly
apportioned, and (4) that is unrelated to services provided by the state.58 In
Complete Auto Transit Inc., the Court held that if these factors are met, the tax
will be sustained under the Commerce Clause.59
3.

Discussion of Quill

Quill Corporation, a mail-order house, refused to collect a use tax from
customers in North Dakota because it had no offices, warehouses, or
employees in North Dakota.60 The Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause did not bar enforcement of use taxes if contact with the
forum state made such enforcement reasonable.61 The Court concluded:
(1) that Quill Corporation purposefully directed activities to North Dakota;
(2) Quill Corporation’s contacts with North Dakota sufficiently satisfied
due process; and (3) that the tax was related to the benefits Quill
Corporation received from North Dakota.62 However, the Court also
reasoned that if the only connection in a state is made by way of mail or a

55. Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
56. See id. at 276.
57. Id. at 277–78.
58. See id. at 279 (reaffirming the four-prong test established in past cases).
59. Id.
60. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992).
61. See id. at 308 (affirming the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process
Clause does not bar enforcement of that State’s use tax against Quill Corporation because the use tax
is related to the benefits Quill Corporation receives from access to the State).
62. See generally id. at 306–08 (determining Quill Corporation’s activities and benefits received
from the state constitute sufficient contacts to satisfy due process).
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common carrier, the seller does not meet the level of nexus required by the
Commerce Clause.63
Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized that Congress has the ability
and ultimate power to decide the extent and role of states in this analysis.64
Put simply, retailers must be physically present in the state to satisfy the
substantial nexus requirement set out in Complete Auto Transit.65 The Court
based this decision on both Commerce Clause and stare decisis grounds.66
First, the Court found that the requirements of due process were met
regardless of physical presence in the taxing state.67 Second, stare decisis
provides that courts will determine points in litigation according to
precedent,68 though the Court put too much weight onto these factors,
which preserved the “antiquated” physical presence rule.69 Although “the
flaws with the rules were evident,” the Court believed that the issue was
better suited for Congress.70
4.

Discussion of Wayfair

In Wayfair, the Supreme Court reconsidered the validity of the physical
presence rule set out in Bellas Hess and Quill. Critics of Quill recognize that
a nexus standard is necessary, but argue that the Supreme Court should

63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. at 318.
65. Id. at 317.
66. See id. at 317 (concluding the physical presence rule aligns with the principles of stare
decisis); see also Swain, supra note 2, at 357 (“Quill Corporation fared better under the Commerce
Clause.”).
67.
The requirements of due process are met irrespective of a corporation’s lack of physical presence
in the taxing State. Thus, to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process
Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we
overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process.
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 308.
68. Id. at 317; see also Swain, supra note 2, at 317 (“The doctrine of stare decisis provides that
courts will adhere to existing precedent and not disturb settled points.”).
69. See Swain, supra note 2, at 360 (arguing “[t]he Court may have given too much weight to the
pragmatic factors,” and thus “perpetuate[d] an antiquated rule”).
70. Nicole Soulsby, Strength in Numbers: South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. and the Ripple Effect
Occurring in State Legislatures to Circumvent the Quill Corp Physical Presence Test for Use Taxation,
11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 583, 593–94 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court was borderline apologetic in
defending the controversial physical presence rule—stating that . . . the flaws with the [physical
presence] rule were evident, and that Congress can correct their decision by enacting legislation that
does away with the rule . . . .”).
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address the issue appropriately with regard to current times.71 In Wayfair,
Justice Kennedy opined Quill actually created market distortions that the
rule was meant to resolve.72 Further, the Supreme Court stated that
“[p]hysical presence is not necessary to create a substantial nexus.”73 The
Court also recognized that the physical presence rule provides an incentive
for avoiding physical presence by acting as a tax shelter.74 The technological
development since 1992 requires a different perspective on physical
presence because consumers are now closer to retailers than ever before,
regardless of the location of the storefront.75 The Supreme Court “should
not maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the
State.”76 Though Supreme Court precedent previously required a brightline physical presence rule, “[t]he rejection of the historic physical presence
test leads to the conclusion that an economic presence can be sufficient to
create the substantial nexus required under Complete Auto Transit[.]”77
However, Wayfair only addressed the first prong (requiring a substantial
nexus to the taxing state), so trial courts must still determine whether a tax
meets the remaining requirements.78

71. See Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 549, 553 (2000) (“[W]hile nexus rules are clearly necessary in the existing
environment . . . the debate should focus on rules that are appropriate to the twenty-first century, not
the nineteenth.”).
72. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092 (2018) (“Quill creates rather than
resolves market distortions.”).
73. Id. at 2093.
74. See id. at 2094 (“In effect, Quill has come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for
businesses that decide to limit their physical presence and still sell their goods and services to a State’s
consumers[.]”).
75. See id. at 2095 (“The ‘dramatic technological and social changes’ of our ‘increasingly
interconnected economy’ mean that buyers are ‘closer to most major retailers’ than ever before—
‘regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront.’” (quoting Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl,
575 U.S. 1, 18 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
76. Id.
77. Erin M. Haney et al., Supreme Court Overturns the Quill Physical Presence Test for State Tax
Collection, VARNUM ATTYS AT L. (June 21, 2018), https://www.varnumlaw.com/newsroompublications-supreme-court-overturns-the-quill-physical-presence-test-for-state-tax-collectio
[http://perma.cc/U6XE-3CHG].
78. See id. (observing while the Wayfair decision held the “substantial nexus” requirement was
satisfied, it did “not result in a conclusion as the case now must return to the trial court for a
determination whether the tax at issue satisfies the remaining three requirements”).
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III. WHO GOT IT RIGHT AND WHY
A state has “enforcement jurisdiction” over a person when a state has the
ability to enforce the collection or payment of a tax.79 Though the growth
in technology makes it more challenging to apply state tax laws, this alone
should not suffice as an excuse for avoiding the issue or waiting for
Congress to find a way to handle it.80 When Wayfair was decided:
[N]ew sales tax legislation had been passed or was pending in thirty-two out
of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax. This legislation asserted either
a nexus based on the sales activity in a state without regard to the seller’s
physical presence in the state or imposed requirements similar to Colorado’s
notice and reporting requirements previously discussed. Additionally, fortyone out of the forty-five states that impose a sales tax had instituted some
form of legislation that expanded physical nexus, such as New York did in its
Amazon statute, by using affiliate programs as a way of establishing a physical
presence.81

However, to determine a meaningful solution to the e-commerce problem,
it must address who is subject to the tax and whether it is administrable.82
A. Impact
The rise of e-commerce resulted in a massive loss in state sales tax
revenue.83 These losses not only take away from state services and
infrastructure, but contribute to the “effectively tax-free status of Internet
79. See Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Tax Due Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State Taxation,
20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 375 (2017) (“When a state has the ability to require a person to collect or pay
a tax, the state has what is termed ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ over the person. Understanding the
requirements of the Due Process Clause for enforcement jurisdiction is critical to understanding when
a state may require a remote vendor to collect and remit a use tax or pay an income tax.”).
80. See Soulsby, supra note 70, at 619 (“South Dakota v. Wayfair is the right case for the Supreme
Court to implement a system not defined solely by physical presence.”).
81. Nick Surma, Overturning Quill: Why Wayfair Was Correctly Decided and What Lies Ahead,
93 N.D. L. REV. 521, 538 (2018).
82. See Hellerstein, supra note 71, at 550–54 (reviewing the main constitutional and practical
issues states face in administering taxes against e-commerce vendors).
83. See Holderness, supra note 79, at 377–78 (“The relative ease with which transactions can be
initiated and completed over the Internet has contributed to, and likely accelerated, the growth of
interstate transactions in the United States. This growth is presumably good for the economy but
presents challenges for many states as they struggle to apply their tax laws to these interstate
transactions. For example, one recent study found that the states’ struggles resulted in the noncollection of $11.4 billion in sales and use tax revenues from sales made through e-commerce in
2012.”).
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sales.”84 Thus, we must review the impact that Wayfair had on the
government, economy, businesses, consumers, and practitioners following
the decision. Doing so makes it clear that the Supreme Court’s binary
decision was not enough to resolve the issues that followed.
1.

Government

Though Wayfair re-examines state nexus questions, the implications of
the decision “extend to other state-imposed taxes” as well.85 This comes
after the opinion removed any doubts about physical presence by creating a
bright-line rule.86 While Wayfair primarily resolved nexus issues, it has
“effectively endorsed assertions by states that physical presence was not a
prerequisite for the imposition of income tax and other entity-level taxes.”87
This new ability to collect taxes from Internet retailers creates a revenue
windfall.88 One of the reasons this issue arose was because there was a
widespread problem in states enforcing use tax.89
A significant impact on the government is that most states are not
prepared to enforce these taxes without making considerable legislative
changes. Following the Supreme Court decision, the Tax Foundation
suggests following what they term “the Wayfair checklist.”90 The checklist
84. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
1177, 1199 (2017) (describing the Quill controversy and providing reasons why the Court should
overturn the decision).
85. See Chris Hopkins, Implications of Wayfair Beyond Sales Tax, FIN. EXECS. INT’L (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.financialexecutives.org/FEI-Daily/August-2018/Implications-of-Wayfair-BeyondSales-Tax.aspx [http://perma.cc/NF6R-VXV7] (“[T]he Wayfair decision’s implications extend to other
state-imposed taxes.”).
86. See id. (“[I]mplicit in the Wayfair decision is an acceptance by the [C]ourt of a statutory
bright-line activity threshold for the imposition of state tax under the commerce clause.”).
87. Id.
88. See Jon Chesto, In Wayfair Case, Supreme Court to Let States Collect Internet Sales Tax,
BOS. GLOBE (June 21, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2018/06/21/supreme-courtlet-states-collect-internet-sales-tax/OZYKuuHcqN9yJgHYQPSWnK/story.html [http://perma.cc/
L9CF-WZ9A] (“The US Supreme Court on Thursday opened the door for states to collect more sales
taxes from Internet retailers, dealing a blow to Boston-based online seller Wayfair but potentially
creating a revenue windfall for Massachusetts.”).
89. See William R. Stromsem et al., Sales Taxes After Wayfair-Challenges and Opportunities for CPAs,
TSCPA (July 2018), https://www.tscpa.org/advocacy/governmental-affairs/news/sales-taxes-afterwayfair-challenges-and-opportunities-for-cpas [http://perma.cc/LAN9-HE49] (“One of the reasons
South Dakota asserted economic nexus for sales taxes was the widespread lack of compliance and
problems with enforcing their use tax.”).
90. Joseph Bishop-Henchman et al., Post-Wayfair Options for States, TAX FOUND.
(Aug. 29, 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180904165435/Tax-Foundation-FF6091.pdf
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is satisfied by “adopting a de minimis threshold, explicitly rejecting retroactive
enforcement, and adhering to uniformity and simplification rules in the
Streamlines Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).”91 The Supreme
Court has strongly encouraged SSUTA.92 State policy choices include
deciding on the generosity of the threshold to adopt, the qualifying period,
the enforcement date, the inclusion of local taxes, and how to use
revenues.93 In making a law that follows the new constitutional standard,
states must look at the following factors: safe harbor, no retroactive
collection, single state-level administration, uniformed definitions,
simplified tax rate structure, software (provided by the state), and
immunity.94
Though South Dakota is compliant with this checklist, the Tax
Foundation has reviewed state statutes and regulations and classified them
according to their status.95 There are states that are compliant with the
checklist; those that should proceed with caution; states that should only
proceed after making legislative changes; those that are not compliant; and
states with no sales tax.96 Texas is one of the majority of states that should
only proceed to tax Internet sellers after making legislative changes.97 Texas
would have to undergo significant simplifications because it is not a SSUTA
member and has 1,594 tax jurisdictions.98 Additionally, Texas does not
adhere to uniform definitions or provide tax lookup software.99 The
Tax Foundation suggests Texas “should pursue SSUTA membership
and/or significant simplification of its local sales tax . . . .”100 Policymakers
[http://perma.cc/7TEN-L7K4]. The Tax Foundation is a tax policy nonprofit and research institution
founded in 1932.
91. Id.
92. See Sofia Morales, The Amazon Tax: Collecting the Use Tax in the Aftermath of the New York
Appellate Court’s Recent Holding, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 56, 80 (2012) (“[T]he SSUTA is not only
appropriate but has been strongly encouraged by the Supreme Court.”).
93. Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 90.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (classifying states as “green lights,” “flashing yellow lights,” “steady yellow lights,” or
“red lights” according to their completion of the Wayfair checklist).
97. See id. at 18 (“[Texas] should pursue SSUTA membership and/or significant simplification
of its local sales taxes prior to pursuing enabling legislation similar to South Dakota’s. The Texas
Comptroller has issued a statement inviting input for future legislation and disavowing any retroactive
application.”).
98. Id.
99. See id. (“[Texas] does not adhere to common definitions or provide base/rate lookup
software . . . .”).
100. See id.
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should focus on statutory longevity by making decisions that are likely
constitutional, immune from suit, and uphold voluntary compliance.101
2.

Economy

In an interview with George Kelemen, CEO of the Texas Retailers
Association, Kelemen commented that Quill was decided two years before
“the first online sale in history.”102 Twenty-six years later, the
Department of Commerce now claims that $450 billion of retail sales, or
more than 13% of all retail sales, are conducted online.103 Kelemen focuses
on fairness, stating the physical presence systems put brick-and-mortar
retailers at an 8.25% disadvantage compared to out-of-state retailers.104 In
Texas, the tax rate by which traditional retailers are disadvantaged is 6.25%,
but local tax jurisdictions impose a 2% tax that combines to equal that
8.25%.105 While states do collect from some big chain online retailers that
have physical presence, there is an estimated $13 billion in potential tax flow
from websites that are not paying.106 Bill Longley, legislative counsel at the
Texas Municipal League, commented: “It’s not a big- or small-city issue. It
could theoretically increase the sales tax base in every city across the
state.”107 Texas does not have an income tax, so it relies on sales taxes.108
Sales tax dollars constitute more than 50% of sales tax revenue along with
city revenues as well.109 A previous comptroller estimate shows that these
taxes could generate an additional $800 million for the state and another

101. See id. at 21 (“[P]olicymakers should build systems meant to last; ones that are surely
constitutional, that are free from the threat of lawsuit, and that uphold a system of voluntary
compliance.”).
102. Paul Flahive, How Supreme Court Decision Could Mean $1 Billion For Texas, TEX. PUB. RADIO
(May 29, 2018), http://www.tpr.org/post/how-supreme-court-decision-could-mean-1-billion-texas
[http://perma.cc/3CGA-EPKA].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.051 (imposing use tax and defining the rate as the same
percentage as sales tax); see also State Rates, supra note 9 (offering an option to calculate local taxes in
Texas based on address).
106. Flahive, supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. Paul Takahashi, How the Supreme Court Ruling on Online Sales Taxes Affects Texas Online
Shoppers, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (June 21, 2018), https://www.expressnews.com/business/
local/article/How-the-Supreme-Court-ruling-on-online-sales-13014783.php
[http://perma.cc/3G
WL-VNA4].
109. Flahive, supra note 102.
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$200 million for cities.110 For these reasons, local retailers have complained
about the creation of an unfair marketplace.111 With somewhere
between 10,000 and 12,000 different taxing authorities across the United
States, this complicates business compliance.112
3.

Businesses

Both large and small businesses alike will face compliance issues.113 The
major impacts on these businesses can be broken down into the following:
(1) the state must individually tax across boundaries, (2) Internet retailers
must track all sales and tax changes where they conduct business,
(3) Internet retailers must establish systems to collect sales tax, (4) Internet
retailers will need to reevaluate bottom line profit and loss numbers, and
(5) brick-and-mortar retailers will benefit from consumers who used to state
taxes by shopping online.114 This Comment takes the position, along with
others such as David Agrawal, that compliance costs fall disproportionately
on small businesses.115 “Smaller online companies may find themselves
subject to [tax] nexus in new jurisdictions and are less likely to have
multistate . . . software and in-house expertise.”116 This will add to their
compliance costs by potentially requiring small businesses to hire someone
for compliance efforts or using third party consultants.117
Larger businesses have more factors to consider, such as the physical
presence of their warehouse or even delivery vehicles.118 Another problem
arising in large businesses that adds to the complexity are cases where online
retailers simply serve as platforms for third party sales.119 Such
circumstances have led the Texas Comptroller to suggest amending the
110. See id.
111. See Takahashi, supra note 108 (“Brick-and-mortar retailers have also complained that the
precedent creates an unfair marketplace, putting them at a disadvantage to Internet businesses.”).
112. Flahive, supra note 102.
113. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (“Wayfair will greatly complicate state sales tax
compliance for smaller companies. . . . Larger online companies likely have sales or use tax nexus in
many states, and some possibly in all states[] . . . .”).
114. Tom Wheelwright, How Will the ‘Wayfair’ Supreme Court Decision Affect Retailers? 5 Ways.,
LMTONLINE (July 18, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lmtonline.com/news/article/How-Will-theWayfair-Supreme-Court-Decision-13082332.php [http://perma.cc/37TH-XTKJ].
115. David Agrawal is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky, where he teaches
public policy and economics. Flahive, supra note 102.
116. Stromsem et al., supra note 89.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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definition of “seller” and “retailer” in the Texas Tax Code to include
marketplace platforms.120
Another concern among businesses is the retroactive application of
Wayfair.121 This is because many states do not have a statute of limitations
for assessments against taxpayers.122 Though Rhode Island is the only state
that has announced potentially applying Wayfair retroactively, statements
made in briefs are not binding.123 While Texas continues to review rules,
it is important to stress that businesses should not be subjected to taxation
without bounds if remote sellers do not have a physical presence in
Texas.124 There is also the fear that, along with owing back taxes,
e-commerce merchants would owe interest on those back taxes.125 Before,
the physical presence test may have made businesses reluctant to have
offices or warehouses in other states.126 However, because of Wayfair,
businesses may begin to expand activities which will ultimately benefit
consumers by enhancing sales and improving customer service.127
The New York Times goes so far as to relate this to “taxation without
representation” because it puts the responsibility on the seller to calculate,
collect, and remit sales taxes to the home state of the buyer even when the
retailer has no stores, employees, voting power, or political voice.128 States
have been losing out on billions of dollars in tax revenue even though some
larger Internet retailers “have begun collecting sales tax regardless
of . . . physical presence.”129 It is up to the Texas Comptroller of Public
120. Id.; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.008 (defining the terms “seller” and “retailer”).
121. Stromsem et al., supra note 89.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Morales, supra note 92, at 83.
126. Stromsem et al., supra note 89.
127. See id. (“With nexus possibly determined by revenues and the location of online buyers
instead of a seller’s physical presence, companies may be less reluctant to establish an in-state physical
presence if they will be subject to a state’s tax collection obligation under a state’s economic nexus
standard in any event.”).
128. Jessica Melugin, Supreme Court’s Wayfair Decision Will Hurt Online Shopping, N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/supreme-court-wayfair-southdakota-online-shopping.html [https://perma.cc/J3PG-Q595].
129. Mark Walsh, Opinion Analysis: Court Expands States’ Ability to Require Internet Retailers to Collect
Sales Tax, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysiscourt-expands-states-ability-to-require-internet-retailers-to-collect-sales-tax/
[http://perma.cc/M6
6M-FGJU]. See generally Daniel Tyler Cowan, Recent Development, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax on
the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxation & Finance and the Dormant
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Accounts to implement the principles of Supreme Court decisions in a
manner that best serves the state itself, its citizens, and the businesses
operating in the state.130 The amount of tax collection and revenue increase
will depend on how the agency implements and resolves issues that the
Supreme Court’s ruling raises.131
Though there is much to gain, states struggle to impose these tax
obligations.132 Sellers that engage in e-commerce carry a heavy burden
because compliance requires:
a seller [to] determine within which states it has nexus, whether the items sold
are taxable in the consumer’s state, and whether a customer is exempt from
the tax. In addition to these steps, a seller in compliance must maintain
adequate books and records, the standards for which vary from state to
state.133

Other struggles include unique sourcing problems, such as when no delivery
address is provided or when billing information is inadequate.134
4.

Consumers

On the other hand, from the consumer perspective, many believe Wayfair
diminishes the beneficial rivalry that essentially allows them to “vote
with their wallets.”135 Because states can essentially export their tax policies
to tax businesses in other states, many argue that the online buyer is put at
a disadvantage.136 It creates fewer political consequences on businesses
and states, minimizing the incentive to maintain reasonable tax

Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1423–24 (2010) (explaining the “Amazon Tax” that requires
out-of-state retailers to collect use tax if they have marketing affiliates in the state producing at least
$10,000 in sales).
130. Press Release, Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accts., Comptroller Issues Initial Guidance on
Remote Seller Sales Tax Decision by U.S. Supreme Court (June 27, 2018), https://comptroller.
texas.gov/about/media-center/news/2018/180627-wayfair.php [http://perma.cc/K99K-5GQ2].
131. Id.
132. See generally Sara Schoenfeld, Much Ado About Nexus: The States Struggle to Impose Sales Tax
Obligations on Out-of-State Sellers Engaged in E-Commerce, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 263, 280 (2013); (describing how state revenue losses from uncollected sales taxes are motivating
states to “apply[] their state sales tax collection laws to out-of-state vendors more aggressively”).
133. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 282–83.
135. Melugin, supra note 128.
136. See, e.g., id.
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rates.137 This decision likely means consumers will see an increase in online
prices.138
However, this Comment does not agree with this position from the
consumer perspective. The Tax Foundation has made an effort to clarify
Wayfair and eliminate consumers’ confusion related to the decision.139 A
major concern of consumers is whether Wayfair will make online purchases
more expensive or hurt e-commerce.140 In short, e-commerce will not be
hurt because e-commerce retailers will have to collect the same taxes
collected by every other retailer.141 These are not new taxes, but taxes that
should have always been reported and paid—whether by retailers or
consumers.142 Additionally, even if retailers had to increase prices to
comply, Internet retailers have many other benefits over brick-and-mortar
retailers.143 Online shoppers still benefit from the ease, convenience, and
wider selection that e-commerce has to offer. As the collection of ecommerce taxes “grew from almost zero to half of all sales, e-commerce has
continued to grow sharply.”144 Thus, Wayfair “is almost certainly too late”
to create a dramatic shift from shopping online to shopping in brick-andmortar stores.145
5.

Practitioners

The decision also creates opportunities and challenges for those whose
job it is to comply with the new requirements.146 When the Supreme Court
looked at South Dakota’s law, six features were designed to prevent any
137. See id. (“With fewer political consequences, there is less incentive to keep tax rates
reasonable.”).
138. Takahashi, supra note 108.
139. See generally Joseph Bishop-Henchman, What Does the Wayfair Decision Really Mean for States,
Businesses, and Consumers?, TAX FOUND. (June 9, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/what-does-thewayfair-decision-really-mean-for-states-businesses-and-consumers/ [http://perma.cc/P3L8-HXNX]
(eliminating confusion about the Wayfair decision by providing answers to interpretation questions).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. (“Internet purchases were not exempt from tax[.]”).
143. See id. (“[E]-commerce’s strengths over brick-and-mortar are more about convenience,
wider selection, and lower costs, it’s unlikely this decision will hurt large e-commerce firms.”).
144. Id.
145. Alana Semuels, Will a New Supreme Court Decision Change Online Shopping?, ATLANTIC
(June 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/what-the-supremecourts-decision-on-online-sales-tax-means/563405/ [http://perma.cc/8FJZ-H24Z].
146. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (describing the benefits and challenges the Wayfair
decision imposes).
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undue burden on interstate commerce: (1) a safe harbor that would exclude
small retailers (2) no retroactive tax collection (3) single administration on
the state-level (4) simplified tax structure (5) uniform definitions and rules,
and (6) state software access with immunity privileges for those who rely
and try to comply.147 States that attempt to collect sales taxes on ecommerce without meeting these provisions will face a legal challenge as
they try to rationalize their statutes using the Wayfair decision as a guide to
what is permissible. The current software will need to be reprogrammed in
order to meet compliance requirements as well.148
However, many compliance services will likely be offered to large ecommerce sellers.149 “Congress could also potentially pass RTPA,” which
would provide protections limiting interstate audits, requiring states to help
pay for integration software, and establishing a sales threshold to exempt
small businesses from some rules to alleviate the burden on these
retailers.150 South Dakota has received overwhelming support in Wayfair.
Many states will likely follow in updating registration, reporting, and
collection statutes in response to the decision.151 Other states are
challenging or in the process of challenging different aspects of nexus
requirements.152 Retailers should expect states to expand their assertion in
the context of tax collection.153 Tax compliance entities will be monitoring
economic activity, and that will affect thousands of jurisdictions, locally and
statewide.154 Some states are targeting e-commerce groups, while others
are considering enacting notice and reporting rules.155 For example,
Missouri uses an economic nexus approach in what is now termed the

147. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099–2100 (2018); Bishop-Henchman,
supra note 139.
148. See Stromsem et al., supra note 89 (“Computers will need to be reprogrammed to capture
sales by taxing jurisdictions.”).
149. See Bishop-Henchman, supra note 139 (“It is likely that large e-commerce platforms will
provide sales tax compliance services for their sellers.”).
150. Id.
151. See Scott E. Vincent, Report: Taxes in Your Practice: Supreme Court Overturns Physical Presence
Standard for Sales Tax Nexus, 74 J. MO. B. 201, 202 (2018) (“Practitioners will need to monitor new laws,
rules, and regulations as states attempt to stretch nexus and sales tax collection under these new
standards.”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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“Amazon Law” or the Amazon Tax.156 More specifically, the Missouri
statute requires Internet retailers with click-through arrangements to collect
use taxes.157
B. Types of Proposals
Several approaches can be made in attempting to propose a way to tax or
not to tax e-commerce. In 1999, the Advisory Commission on Electronic
Commerce (ACEC) invited interested parties to submit proposals, which
ACEC evaluated based on eighteen criteria.158 ACEC focused on
simplification, changes to taxation, burden on sellers, discrimination,
international application, technology, privacy, and constitutionality.159
ACEC thoroughly discussed the constitutionality of proposals. It first
divided the proposals into categories based on how restrictive the proposals
were.160 ACEC defined radically restrictive proposals as those that would
ban e-commerce taxation altogether in a broad range of transactions.161 An
example would be the Internet Tax Elimination Act that was cosponsored
by Ohio Representatives Kasich and Boehner.162 Another example would
be the proposal to prohibit both sales and use taxes on e-commerce
transactions from businesses to consumers.163 Moderately restrictive
proposals are those that significantly immunize e-commerce economic
activity.164 Moderate proposals impose specific limits on state taxation
power.165 The eCommerce Coalition, including businesses such as Cisco
Systems, Inc., Citigroup, Microsoft, and Wal-Mart, proposed an approach
that would require establishing standards for the state to simplify the current

156. See MO. REV. STAT. § 144.605 (2017) (describing the Missouri Amazon Law); see also
Vincent, supra note 151, at 202 (“Missouri has what is sometimes called an ‘Amazon’ law, which takes
an economic nexus approach similar to the South Dakota Act in Wayfair.”). See generally Cowan,
supra note 129, at 1423–24 (defining the Amazon use tax nexus through the production of $10,000 in
sales by marketing affiliates in the state).
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.605(2)(e) (2017).
158. See Kendall L. Houghton & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce:
Perspectives on Proposals for Change and Their Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9, 45 (2000).
159. Id. at 45–47.
160. See id. at 47–48 (separating proposals by either restrictiveness or simplification).
161. Id. at 48.
162. Id.
163. This proposal was advanced by Virginal Governor Gilmore. Id.
164. Id. at 49.
165. Id.
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system.166 Simplification was a common theme throughout the proposals,
while others focused on technology or origin.167
C. Government Intervention
Though there seems to have been some government involvement
throughout the course of history, it has not been enough to resolve the
nexus issues. In 1997, five years after Quill, the Internet Tax Freedom Act
was introduced.168 The purpose of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)
was to establish a national policy against interfering with interstate ecommerce.169 Because it was met with heavy opposition, it did not garner
support until Congress passed a weaker version of the original in 1998.170
It banned both multiple and discriminatory taxes on e-commerce.171 ITFA
defines e-commerce broadly to include transactions conducted over or
through Internet access.172 Under ITFA, multiple taxes are imposed by the
government on an e-commerce transaction that is also subject to taxation
by another government.173 A discriminatory tax occurs when the tax
policies place e-commerce at a disadvantage compared to more traditional
or brick-and-mortar means.174 A tax is also considered discriminatory if it
places the tax collection burden on a third party in an e-commerce
transaction.175 While these were important moves by Congress, it only
postponed decisions which Congress has still chosen to avoid.
In 1999, Congress continued its efforts by approving a non-binding
resolution to encourage Clinton to seek a ban on e-commerce tariffs.176
166. See id. at 49–50 (“The eCommerce Coalition . . . urged the Commission to recommend
congressional legislation . . . for state-initiated simplification . . . .”).
167. See id. at 50–52.
168. See Kevin J. Smith, Internet Taxes: Congressional Efforts to Control States’ Ability to Tax the World
Wide Web, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, at ¶ {5} (2000), https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=jolt [https://perma.cc/EQT2-XBY7] (“[T]he state may
receive its tax dollar at the expense of the small businesses.”).
169. Id. ¶ {10}.
170. See id. ¶¶ {10}–{11} (“The ITFA was initially met with strong opposition from organized
groups such as the National 39 League of Cities, the National Governor’s Association and others.
After eighteen months of debate, Congress finally passed the ITFA in 1998.”).
171. See id. ¶ {11} (listing which tax levies ITFA bars).
172. Id. ¶ {43}.
173. See id. ¶ {50} (defining multiple taxes).
174. See id. ¶ {45} (defining discriminatory taxes).
175. Id. ¶ {47}.
176. See id. ¶ {8} (“In the Fall of 1999, both houses of Congress approved a non-binding
resolution encouraging President Clinton to seek a permanent international ban on tariffs on electronic
commerce.”).
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The resolution called upon the World Trade Organization to negotiate and
enact a moratorium on e-commerce tariffs.177 One of the problems with
the rise of technology and e-commerce transactions is the Internet nexus,
the main point of discussion.
Believing that ITFA would soon expire, legislatures and governmental
agencies reassessed e-commerce policies, specifically those that affect
economic objectives.178 Potential e-commerce tax revenue raises concerns
on how to proportion the income among states.179 Another important
consideration is that the classification of e-commerce affects how the
income will be sourced.180
Congress has also made efforts to aid in the debate. In 1999, Congress
introduced H.R. 3252 as the Internet Tax Elimination Act.181 It amended
ITFA to make the prohibition on sales or use tax on e-commerce
permanent.182 Then, in 2000, the congressmen who proposed ITFA
introduced the Internet Non-Discrimination Act (INDA), making ITFA
permanent.183 H.R. 3709, or the INDA, permanently extended provisions
that prohibited multiple or discriminatory taxes on e-commerce.184 More
recently, Congress introduced H.R. 6724, the Protecting Businesses from
Burdensome Compliance Cost Act.185 The bill limits the authority of states
and subdivisions to collect taxes owed and to collect information incident

177. See id. (“It also calls upon the WTO to enact a permanent moratorium on electronic
commerce tariffs.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
178. See generally Jonathan Bick, Implementing E-Commerce Tax Policy, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 597
(2000) (introducing e-commerce tax proposals in context of the expiration of IFTA).
179. This also has implications on sales and use taxes, which are discussed in the introduction
of the comment. See id. at 598 (describing “the misclassification of the product and erroneous
treatment for tax purposes [as] a real danger”).
180. There are three classification options: tangible personal property, intangible property, or
services. Id. E-commerce categorized as tangible personal property is normally sourced to the
destination state, while intangible property and services are sourced to the vendor state. See id. at 598–
600 (2000).
181. H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. (1999).
182. Id.
183. See Smith, supra note 168, ¶ {80} (“[They said they would introduce the Internet NonDiscriminatory Act (INDA) that will make the ITFA permanent.”).
184. H.R. 3709, 106th Cong. (2000).
185. This bill was introduced September 6, 2018. See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To limit
the authority of a state to require remote sellers to collect taxes and fees owed by purchasers then
located in such State incident to their purchases of goods and services from such sellers, and for other
purposes.”).
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to the purchase.186 Congress also introduced H.R. 6824 as the Online Sales
Simplicity and Small Business Relief Act of 2018.187 This bill prohibits
states from imposing tax collection duties on certain remote sellers.188 It
also bans retroactive taxation of e-commerce.189 The bill aims to phase in
compliance in an orderly manner.190 However, it does include an
exemption for small business remote sellers:
In the case of a sale made by a small business remote seller, no State may
impose a sales tax collection duty on any person other than the purchaser if
the sale is made on or after June 21, 2018, and before the date that is 30 days
after the date on which the states develop and Congress approves an interstate
compact, applicable to the State and sale, governing the imposition of tax
collection duties on remote sellers.191

H.R. 6824 also delves into the sense of Congress:
It is the sense of Congress that the States should develop an interstate
compact for the collection of sales tax by remote sellers that identifies a clearly
defined minimum substantial nexus between the remote seller and the taxing
State, that simplifies registration, collection, remittance, auditing, and other
compliance processes to the greatest extent possible in order to avoid undue
burdens on interstate commerce, and that, due to such simplification,
eliminates the need for the continuation of the small business remote seller
exemption under section 4.192

Another similar bill introduced by Congress is H.R. 7184, the No
Retroactive Online Taxation Act of 2018.193
186. See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2018) (providing exceptions and definitions within the bill).
187. This bill was introduced September 13, 2018. See H.R. 6824, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To
prohibit States from retroactively imposing a sales tax collection duty on a remote seller, and for other
purposes.”).
188. See id. (defining a remote seller as “a person without a physical presence in the State who
makes a sale in the State”).
189. See id.
190. See id. (“A state may impose a sales tax collection duty on a remote seller for a sale that
occurs after January 1, 2019.”).
191. See id. (defining a small business remote seller as “a remote seller with gross annual receipts
in the United States during the preceding calendar year in an amount that is not more than
$10,000,000”).
192. Id.
193. This bill was introduced on November 28, 2018. See H.R. 7184, 115th Cong. (2018) (“To
provide for a ban on the retroactive taxation of internet commerce, and for other purposes.”).
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States have also attempted to regulate the matter. The goal for states is
to create legislation that will aid in their efforts and uphold constitutional
scrutiny.194 For example, in November 2018, Texas introduced S.B. 70.195
The purpose of S.B. 70 is to provide an “optional, simplified means of
computing the amount of local use tax remote sellers are required to collect”
as a result of Wayfair.196 The act intends to do so by amending the Tax
Code and Government Code.197
IV. SUGGESTING A POTENTIAL RESOLUTION
A. Current Responses
In creating a potential resolution to e-commerce taxation issues, it is
useful to look at other states and how they have reacted to the Supreme
Court’s decision to overrule the physical presence test to determine nexus
sufficiency. Since Wayfair was decided, many states responded by issuing
administrative guidance or announcing that they are contemplating their
next steps before taking action.198 In their responses, most states have
focused on the overruling of the physical presence requirement.199 While
most states have chosen to avoid interpreting what is unduly burdensome,
Texas has proven to be an exception.200

194. Joseph Bishop-Henchman, Supreme Court Decides Wayfair Online Sales Tax Case, TAX
FOUND. (June 21, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/supreme-court-decides-wayfair-online-sales-taxcase/ [http://perma.cc/S8DY-UV8R] (“In the states, a reminder, 31 states currently have laws taxing
internet sales. Today’s decision will certainly change how states look at these laws but we may see
states trying to see if their versions could survive even if they are less simplified and direct than South
Dakota’s law.”).
195. See Tex. S.B. 70, 86th Leg., R.S. 2019 (“[R]elating to a single use tax rate as an alternative
to combined local use tax rates for computing the amount of local use taxes remote sellers are required
to collect and to the allocation of tax revenue collected at that rate.”).
196. See id. (referring to South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018)).
197. See generally id. (setting forth suggested changes in laws to simplify computation).
198. See generally Jeffery Reed, A Range of State Responses After Wayfair, JD SUPRA (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-range-of-state-responses-after-wayfair-48789/ [http://perma.
cc/8S2U-J7CT] (summarizing a variety of state reactions to the decision).
199. See id. (“[S]tate responses have generally focused on . . . the lifting of the physical presence
requirement.”).
200. See id. (asserting Texas has deviated from interpreting the Court’s unduly burdensome
component).
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Some states took Wayfair as a green light and followed the decision by
issuing guidance and praise to the decision almost immediately.201 These
states believed the decision was consistent with the current nexus sales
tax law.202 Examples of states that followed this approach are: Alabama,
Hawaii, Iowa, North Dakota, and Rhode Island.203
Other states that did not enact laws serving a similar function quickly
announced that they would try to act on the decision for state benefit.204
However, states have shown different ways to do so. For example, Utah
is working on legislation to force remote sellers to collect taxes.205
Another approach taken by states such as South Carolina and Wisconsin
show states intend to use force by administrative fiat.206 Meanwhile,
other states are looking at their present statutes to determine whether
additional regulations will be necessary to force tax collection by remote
sellers.207
Wayfair created a feeling of obligation among states to make an official
announcement regardless of whether they were ready to make that
decision following the opinion, leading to ambiguity and confusion. One
example is the Maryland Comptroller, which issued a question and answer
document.208 The document addressed whether a seller not currently
collecting sales tax must now do so following the opinion.209 The
Maryland Comptroller responded by providing a link to the Supreme
Court opinion, stating that sellers should review and analyze the decision
in the case “to identify how it affects you.”210
201. See id. (explaining some states reacted with enthusiasm by the Court’s decision by providing
praise).
202. See id. (“[C]oncluding [the decision] is consistent with the state’s already-enacted economic
nexus sales tax law.”).
203. See id. (listing the states following the approach consistent with current nexus sales tax law).
204. See id. (explaining many states are reviewing their current code to ensure remote sellers will
collect sales and use tax).
205. See id. (claiming Utah is attempting to force remote sellers to collect taxes).
206. An administrative fiat is an authoritative decree, sanction, or order that is issued that does
not necessarily have the force of law. See id. (“It might be thought that a statute would be necessary.
But the logic seems to be that the general state definitions . . . are already sufficiently broad to cover
remote sellers.”).
207. See id. (“[S]tates are . . . determining whether additional legislation or regulations may be
necessary.”).
208. See, e.g., id. (describing how vague the Maryland Comptroller responded in a question and
answer document).
209. See id. (“One of the questions asks if a seller not currently collecting and remitting Maryland
sales tax needs to begin doing so in the wake of the opinion.”).
210. See id. (encouraging sellers to review the Wayfair decision to understand its impact).
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The Texas Comptroller of Public Accountants also seemed hesitant to
disclose any specific guidance.211 The Comptroller’s office was brief,
mentioning that it “expects the Texas Legislature to play an important
role in addressing key issues when they return in January 2019.”212
However, unlike most states, the Texas Comptroller acknowledged the
unduly burdensome test.213 The Comptroller’s office stated that “in
order to avoid posing an undue burden on interstate commerce, the state
will likely relieve some out-of-state sellers from collection
responsibilities.”214 It did not provide any details on how it intended to
balance the changes.215
Another interesting example is New Hampshire because it is one of the
few states that does not impose a sales tax. New Hampshire has taken an
approach that seeks to protect businesses from being forced to collect
instead of attempting to collect revenue from online sellers.216
Governor Chris Sununu and state leaders have vowed to fight the
Supreme Court case on sales tax by suggesting a strategy that would
require states to notify the New Hampshire State Department of Justice
before states audit a New Hampshire remote seller.217 They also want to
allow the state’s Department of Justice the opportunity to weigh in on the
constitutionality of the tax obligation and allow the Department of Justice
to block tax collection by filing a suit to protect New Hampshire
businesses.218
211. See generally Press Release, supra note 130 (“The agency anticipates that the state and local
governments will see tax collections increase, but the amount depends on the implementation and
resolution of several significant issues raised by the Supreme Court’s ruling.”).
212. Id.
213. See Reed, supra note 198 (“[T]he thinking from the Texas Comptroller’s guidance appears
to be that a delicate balance must be struck between forcing additional remote sellers to collect tax
while also taking steps to ensure the tax collection regime is not unduly burdensome in the abstract
and as applied to certain remote sellers.”).
214. Press Release, supra note 130.
215. See id. (“More specific estimates will be available as the implementation and legislative
process continues.”).
216. See Reed, supra note 198 (“New Hampshire has vowed to ‘fight back’ by seeking to ‘erect
every possible . . . permissible legal and procedural hurdle to prevent other states from forcing our
businesses to collect and use taxes.”).
217. See id. (referencing a press release from New Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu).
218. See id. (purporting New Hampshire’s strategy is to allow “the New Hampshire Department
of Justice to the opportunity to opine on the constitutionality of the tax collection obligation assertion,
potentially even filing suit to block any attempt to impose tax collection on the New Hampshire
Business.”).
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B. Criticism
While both significant praise and criticism have followed Wayfair, one
question comes to mind: is there a better way? This analysis will discuss the
benefits of physical presence and keeping with the Quill decision versus
defenses for doing away with the requirement as decided in the Wayfair
decision.
One perspective is that the physical presence test is the better standard
because it is a bright-line rule that is easily understood by taxpayers, and it
is not subject to interpretation.219 The physical presence test is also favored
because it is believed to reduce the probability that a business will be subject
to multiple, or double, taxation.220 Those that prefer Quill also claim that
it is a more stable and predictable test, which leads to lower administrative
and compliance costs.221 Quill supporters understand that complications
may arise where intangible property and e-commerce are involved, but they
still believe that there is no reason to abandon the physical presence rule.222
They believe the issues can be resolved by uniform state definitions for the
location of the sales to establish nexus.223
Further, many find that Wayfair is not fair.224 Those that agree with this
point of view believe that the decision “may encourage some aggressive
states (California and New York come to mind), and some desperate to
collect more taxes (New Jersey, Connecticut, and Illinois, for instance) to
try to squeeze much more in revenue out of this ruling than South Dakota
did.”225

219. See Vivian Lei, Geoffrey v. Commissioner: The Fall of “Toys R Us” and the Rise of “Tax R
Us”, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 340, 361 (2010) (providing policy arguments in support of the physical
presence test).
220. See id. (arguing Quill helps to reduce multiple taxation of a corporation by various states).
221. See id. (describing a major effect of Quill is its ability to provide “stability and predictability
in the state and local tax systems by lowering administrative and compliance costs.”).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 361–62.
224. See Steven Malagna, Why Wayfair Isn’t Fair, CITY J. (June 26, 2018), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/why-wayfair-isnt-fair-15990.html [http://perma.cc/W24X-3FQS] (commenting on
the need for Congress to set limits in response to the Supreme Court’s decision on Internet taxes).
225. Id. This fear is based on the fact that the opinion does not define a nexus standard. See id.
(“What Wayfair mainly does is admit that the old standard of physical presence is no longer adequate,
which means that states can now set a much lower threshold for when they can start requiring a
merchant to collect taxes.”).
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On the other hand, others favor the result of the Wayfair opinion.226
Supporters believe that if Amazon is already doing it, then other businesses
should be able to follow, especially since software will be made available to
facilitate the change.227
C. Proposal
Looking to the future of e-commerce taxes, “[w]hether the change is
mandated by Congress, a Supreme Court decision or just the fear of bad
publicity, the sooner businesses get ready to collect state sales taxes in every
jurisdiction around the country, the better off they will be.”228 The ideal
solution will provide incentives229 and eliminate discrimination.230
The Supreme Court should have answered the issue more directly in a
way that would resolve the debate.231 Some believe this issue rests solely
in the hands of Congress.232 However, Congress may not be in the best
position to make this decision if it means that “there are potent concentrated
interests on both sides of potential legislation [that makes a] stalemate seem

226. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2018) (“Though Quill was wrong
on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since then the Internet revolution has made its earlier
error all the more egregious and harmful.”).
227. Michael C. Dorf, Congress, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Wayfair Case, DORF ON L.
(June 21, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/congress-dormant-commerce-clause-and.html
[http://perma.cc/DA6E-ZZ3A] (arguing Wayfair is defensible on its merits).
228. Alex Paladino, E-commerce Companies don’t pay Local Sales Taxes. They Need to get Serious
About That., RECODE (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.recode.net/2018/4/17/17248244/ecommercegovernment-local-internet-sales-tax-supreme-court-trump-amazon [http://perma.cc/S9PJ-2PB9].
229. See generally Darien Shanske, State Options After Wayfair, MEDIUM (June 22, 2018),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/state-options-after-wayfair-3bfe9c87eef5
[http://
perma.cc/3RUP-P7S6] (advising states to “offer meaningful vendor reimbursement for compliance
costs and/or free compliance software”).
230. See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court’s Internet Sales Tax Ruling is Billion-Dollar Boon
for States, NAT’L L. J. (June 21, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/21/
supreme-courts-internet-sales-tax-ruling-is-billion-dollar-boon-for-states/ [http://perma.cc/T6QMWVWX] (“[T]he Quill decision was . . . giving [an] unfair advantage to internet retailers over brick-andmortar stores that must pay sales tax.”).
231. See Brian Galle, Essay, Kill Quill, Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on
Congressional Control of State Taxation, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 158, 161 (2018) (“Congress is not a
fully trustworthy custodian of state taxing power.”).
232. James R. Eads Jr. & David F. Golden, E-Commerce Taxation Issues for Online Businesses, 5 GA.
B.J. 14, 17 (2000) (stating Congress is in a better position to require the collection of e-commerce
taxation from vendors).
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likely.”233 The Supreme Court did not clear up any confusion.234 It has
also failed to offer a clear alternative.235
Constructing a new approach requires a deeper analysis of Wayfair. 236
Many other states have adopted aggressive laws that test constitutional
restrictions.237 Texas needs to follow this trend because it is too early in
the legislative process to know whether any of the proposed bills by
Congress will be enacted or move forward at all. The Supreme Court is
headed in the right direction, but it did not answer any questions regarding
the substantial nexus debate. Instead, states will continue asking the same
questions, but instead through the scope of economic nexus.238
Texas should move forward because this author does not believe Wayfair
will negatively impact businesses or individuals. The Supreme Court did not
impose any new tax on e-commerce. They are just changing regulations on
how online retailers collect the sales tax that all other retailers have to
collect.239 One of the biggest reasons for the shift from brick-and-mortar
stores to e-commerce is convenience, selection, and sometimes even lower
costs.240 Additionally, because legislation seems to be headed in the right
direction to protect smaller businesses, I do not think it should raise
concern.241 South Dakota has received praise for setting a good example
233. Galle, supra note 231, at 162.
234. Bryan S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: E-confusion or
E-collection, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 203, 204–05 (2000) (providing an overview of the Streamlined Sales Tax
System which was created to clarify the confusion arising from the tax regime at that time); Jeffrey
Krasney, Wayfair, Quill & The Physical Presence Test: Bright-Line Standard or Diminished Relevance Paradox,
37 ABA TAX TIMES 17, 20 (2018) (“[C]ongress had chosen not to act. Congress is well aware that the
change in landscape has been significant.”).
235. Matthew C. Boch, Way(un)fair: United States Supreme Court Decision Ends State Tax Physical
Presence Nexus Test, 53 ARK. L. 18, 2522 (2018) (“Wayfair has overruled Quill but it has not provided a
clear alternative, instead offering essentially a balancing test of contacts and burdens.”).
236. See generally Timothy M. Todd, Supreme Court’s Quill and Wayfair Cases Explained, FORBES
(June 27, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timtodd/2018/06/27/supreme-courtsquill-and-wayfair-cases-explained/#649c5fe772a4 [http://perma.cc/82W7-XAA7] (“After Wayfair,
it’s a new world for online retailers.”).
237. See Soulsby, supra note 70, at 596–97 (discussing states adopting aggressive laws testing
constitutional bounds).
238. See Maddison, supra note 33 (“[I]f [Quill]’s physical presence rule is retired, state courts will
ask the same questions, but through the lens of ‘economic nexus.’”).
239. See Bishop-Henchman, supra note 139 (“Internet purchases were not exempt from tax, but
in many cases it looked that way to consumers.”).
240. See id. (stating e-commerce sales will not suffer from any new taxes due to other benefits
which make them still more favorable than brick-and-mortar stores).
241. See H.R. 6824, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (setting forth the Online Sales Simplicity and
Small Business Relief Act of 2018).
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by including compliance software and simplified state rules in its
provision.242 Legislation has also been proposed to account for compliance
costs and ease the transition.243 Because states will be reaping the benefit
of a potentially increased tax revenue, states should be required to pay or
subsidize the cost of integrating tax collection software.244
It is “imperative that Congress use its constitutional power over interstate
commerce to make clear, through legislation, what constitutes a sufficient
nexus for a state to impose sales-tax.”245 In creating legislation, Congress
must also consider that there are several benefits to having tax revenue
collected by someone other than the taxpayer: the tax is more likely to be
paid because it is not their money, it reduces the number of people tax
authorities must interact with to collect, and it reduces the risk of
administrative problems because the taxes are collected by a third party.246
There are two prominent models that Texas could implement to future
legislation to mandate sales tax for e-commerce.247 Some states follow a
notice and report model, which gives remote sellers the choice to “either
pay a tax on their tangible goods or record customers and inform them that
they have to pay.”248 This Comment proposes Texas follow a model similar
to South Dakota, one that generates revenue directly by mandating that
retailers pay if they meet a revenue or sales quota, because such a model is
more efficient.249 States should also determine if an origin or destinationbased tax is in its best interest.250 Texas is currently an origin-based tax
242. See Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 139 (“For instance, South Dakota gives immunity
from audit to sellers who encounter errors made by sales tax software programs. It is likely that large
e-commerce platforms will provide sales tax compliance services for their sellers.”).
243. See H.R. 6724, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (setting forth the Protecting Businesses from
Burdensome Compliance Cost Act).
244. See Bishop-Henchman et al., supra note 139 (“Sellers may need to monitor their new
compliance requirements and seek a new software solution, but these costs can be minimized if states
provide the necessary simplifications and protections.”).
245. Malagna, supra note 224.
246. Vetter, supra note 1, at 706.
247. See Taylor N. Armstrong & Caitlin E. Correa, Revenue and Taxation: Sales and Use Taxes,
35 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 187, 197 (2018) (“[T]here are two prominent models mandating sales tax for
remote sellers.”).
248. Id. at 197.
249. See id. at 197–98 (2018) (“South Dakota’s model generates revenue directly through the
online retailer by collecting and remitting a sales tax.”).
250. See Juliana Frenkel, Something’s Gotta Give: Origin-Based E-Commerce Sales Tax, 12 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 133 (2017) (“[I]t is prudent for Congress to finally resolve the circuit split
and agree on a unifying Online Sales Tax Law.”).
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state, but it may be time to change if a uniform model is in sight.251 A
uniform law may be a viable resolution because it would minimize confusion
and difficulty in administration across the country.252
The biggest concern in resolving the debate should consider any burdens
on interstate commerce that may be created.253 Quill is flawed because
“[t]he Court’s reason cannot have been that the Commerce Clause shields
remote vendors from paying the same taxes or bearing the same compliance
obligations as do in-state vendors.”254 The Supreme Court correctly
overturned the physical presence rule because e-commerce should not be a
venue to shelter taxes.255 Such a rule holds states back from receiving
additional tax revenue.256 Even if “individual state residents legally owe use
taxes,” many are confused about or simply ignore this responsibility.257
Further, use taxes are not efficient because it is based on an honor
system.258 It does not work “because individuals purposefully underreport
their unverifiable use tax obligations for the year, or because they are
genuinely ignorant to whether they owe the tax and, if so, on what.”259 The
primary burden in implementing Wayfair placed on taxpayers by states is to
251. See Mark Faggiano, Origin-based and Destination-based Sales Tax Collection 101, TAXJAR
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://blog.taxjar.com/charging-sales-tax-rates/ [http://perma.cc/7GVU-MFX9]
(changing Texas’s tax laws may happen if a there is a change to the model code).
252. See Sally P. Schreiber, Supreme Court overturns Quill’s physical presence requirement, J. ACCT.
(June 21, 2018), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/jun/supreme-court-sales-taxdecision-201819203.html [http://perma.cc/W6BK-C2LT] (discussing a national standard for online
sales and use tax collection).
253. See David Gamage & Devin J. Heckman, A Better Way Forward for State Taxation of
E-Commerce, 92 B.U.L. REV. 483, 486–87 (2012) (arguing that “interstate commerce is only burdened
when an out-of-state vendor bears reporting or compliance costs as a result of a state’s imposing tax
collection duties on the out of state vendor”).
254. Id. at 499.
255. See Clark Calhoun & Andy Yates, Are New Tax Rules for Out-of-State Retailers
Unconstitutional, CFO (July 11, 2016), http://ww2.cfo.com/tax/2016/07/new-tax-rules-state-retailersunconstitutional/ [http://perma.cc/H2GG-4GYK] (describing the physical presence rule as an
“unfair constraint” on the ability to collect sales tax).
256. See Wayfair Ruling Overturns Quill Physical Presence Requirement, GRANT THORNTON
(June 25,
2018),
https://www.grantthornton.com/library/alerts/tax/2018/SALT/General/
wayfair-ruling-overturns-quill-physical-presence-requirement.aspx
[http://perma.cc/T6QC-53SU]
(“[P]hysical presence rule is moving further from economic reality and causing the states to experience
significant sales tax revenue decreases.”).
257. Gamage & Heckman, supra note 253, at 502.
258. See Jennifer Weidler Karpchuk, Farewell Physical Presence: Was the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision
Way off, or Way Fair, 37 ABA TAX TIMES 13, 13 (2018) (describing the use tax system as an honor
system that simply does not work).
259. Id.
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comply with tax law and accessing the tax base.260 If an undue burden
results from Wayfair, it is because the states were left alone without financial
help to support compliance and transition costs.
V. CONCLUSION
“State governments and Congress must now focus on providing a
workable tax framework so that state and local governments, businesses,
and consumers can thrive in light of the [Supreme] Court’s most recent
decision.”261 A review of the information shows that Wayfair is moving in
the right direction for the future of nexus and e-commerce tax laws.
Historically, this topic has been revisited to keep up with social and
technological advancements. Recognition of the burden and role that
implementation will play on the government, economy, businesses,
consumers, and practitioners will help to create better policy decisions in
future legislative decisions. Consequently, there is still a need for reform as
states individually and collectively implement Wayfair.

260. See generally Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill, 37 VA. TAX REV. 313, 331 (2018)
(“[T]he basis of the substantial nexus requirement is to prevent undue burdens on taxpayers engaged
in interstate commerce.”).
261. Surma, supra note 81, at 523.
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